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Two major factors to be considered in prequalifying construction contract bidders are the likely costs and 
risks to be faced by the client upon award of the contract.  Prequalification of too many bidders, although 
lowering client costs, increases risks and causes an excessive overhead on the bidding process. 
 
A method of assessing the relative cost and risk implications associated with individual bidders is proposed.  
This involves calculating the percentage that bids are above the lowest bid in previous auctions, termed C-
Competitiveness.  It is argued that selecting only the lowest and most consistent C-Competitive bidders for a 
proposed contract auction will reduce client, risks and bidding overhead. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
CONTRACTOR SELECTION is a crucial aspect of the construction procurement process as 
different contractors have different levels of cost, quality, efficiency, etc.  Most clients leave the 
task of contractor selection to a consultant.  In undertaking this task, consultants are advised not 
to lose sight of the client's basic requirements, ie, procuring construction work of the best quality 
at the lowest cost that provides the best value for money and that is built as quickly as required 
within budget whilst exposing clients to the minimum risk [5, pp. 232].  This implies that 
consultants select contractors who are likely to: 
 
 (1) be prepared to undertake and complete the work at a competitive price 
 
 (2) complete the work on time 
 
 (3) construct the work to the required quality standards 
 
 (4) execute the work without a significant risk of extra financial burden on the client. 
 
 Contract1 auctioning by sealed bidding is the most common 
method of contractor selection in the market-based countries.  
                     
    1  A contract may comprise several projects for the construction of building and/or infrastructure work.  
Although the term 'project' is often used in a construction context, in this paper we prefer to use the term 'contract' 
instead as it more correctly denotes the object of the bidding process, ie., to secure a contract.  Hence the term 
'contract type' relates to the intended function of the projects contained in the contract, eg., a school or hostel 
contract.  For consistency we use the term 'contract size' to denote the monetary value of a contract (usually the 
lowest bid). 
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This aims to use the market mechanism to ensure optimal price, 
time, quality and risk (PTQR) for the client.  In open 
competition, consultants often have a good idea in advance, 
which of the competitors will be 'in the frame' for the contract 
award.  This, with a need to minimise the costs of bidding, is 
the main motivation for the use of a closed competition.  
Bidders are preselected (prequalified) on their likelihood of 
entering low bids, producing good quality work on time, 
presenting little risk to the owner or a combination of these or 
other 'desirable' characteristics. 
 
 Prequalification has been defined as a process of 
determining a candidate's competence or ability to meet the 
specific requirements for a task involving a wide range of 
criteria for which information is often qualitative or 
subjective [21, pp. 169].  This may result in the selection of 
bidders who are unable or unwilling, or the non-selection of 
bidders who are able and willing, to fulfil the above criteria. 
 Time, quality and risk are most frequently assessed on the 
reputation of the contractor, with larger contractors often 
preferred to smaller contractors irrespective of the proposed 
contract size [4]. 
 
 In this paper we consider a more objective means of 
prequalifying bidders based on their previous price levels in 
competition - C-Competitiveness. 
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 2. PREQUALIFICATION 
 
 Prequalification systems may be classified into two groups. 
 
 The first group sets out general ground rules and framework 
for competitive tendering irrespective of the type of contract. 
 These may be intended for national use such as the UK's Codes 
of Procedure for Single and Two Stage Selective Tendering [17, 
18] or specially devised to suit the needs of a particular 
client body.  Public sector clients who, for the sake of public 
accountability, are forced to follow a strict procedure, 
normally fall into this category [eg 12]. 
 
 The second group of prequalification systems is concerned 
with the selection of specific bidders for a particular 
contract.  In Hong Kong for example, the Government prequalifies 
bidders for contracts that have unusual requirements.  These 
include unusual scope or complexity of work; unusually high 
value contracts; very rigid time constraint; construction 
calling for a high level of co-ordination, technical expertise 
or unusual technology; unusual funding or financial 
arrangements; and non-standard forms of contract [13]. 
 
 The benefits of prequalification for both clients and 
contractors are well documented [20].  For clients, 
prequalification aids in distinguishing unwilling and 
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inexperienced contractors from willing and experienced 
contractors.  This should minimise the probability of contractor 
default or delays in bidding and enable a reduction in the 
number of eligible contractors involved.  For contractors, 
prequalification should minimise the number of unqualified 
contractors who might enter unrealistic bids, provide a direct 
opportunity to decline without fear of future disqualification, 
and protect contractors from being awarded contracts they are 
not capable of performing.  Also, due to reducing the number of 
bidders, the a priori probability of each bidder winning the 
contract is increased.  In addition, surety companies may also 
benefit as prequalification should minimise the risk of 
contractor failure to discharge the contract. 
 
 Potential problems faced by clients using prequalification 
systems include inflated development costs, difficulties in 
developing quantifiable criteria and formalising the decision 
making process to make objective and sound decisions, and the 
possibility of higher contract prices when reducing the numbers 
of bidders.  Potential problems for contractors include the 
possibility of unfair exclusion from the bidding process, and 
the expenditure of resources on promotion and public relations 
to secure an opportunity to participate in the bidding process. 
 
 Carefully structured prequalification systems for bidder 
selection appear to be generally under used in the construction 
industry.  This results in (1) subjective bidder selection and 
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(2) the involvement of many bidders.  Subjective practices may 
result in the unnecessary exclusion of bidders who would satisfy 
prequalification criteria, and the selection of bidders who 
would not satisfy prequalification criteria. 
 
 Procuring bids from too many bidders is likely to result 
in:- 
 
o higher bidding overheads of approximately 0.7 - 1 per cent 
of contract value per bidder [8]. 
 
o bidders having to make more bids to reach target turnover. 
 
o bidders having less control over the choice of work they 
really want to undertake. 
 
o bidders having less accuracy in tender pricing and greater 
chance of errors of omission. 
 
 
 3. C-COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Degrees of competitiveness 
 
 With either open or selective tendering the contractor has 
a two stage decision process to make - whether to bid or not 
and, if the former, the various bids and alternatives he could 
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offer. 
 
 If a contractor chooses to enter a bid, a baseline 
'Estimate' is usually made.  A percentage mark up is then 
applied (the 'Estimate' may or may not be a genuine estimate of 
the contractor's likely costs of discharging the contract - its 
exact nature is not important to this discussion except that it 
is intended to provide a consistent baseline for bidding).  Some 
bidders incorporate the estimated value of other considerations, 
such as off-site overheads, into their mark up. 
 
 Contractors have six basic options in selectively tendered 
auctions [23]: 
 
 (1) decline to receive tender documents 
 (2) return tender documents without a bid 
 (3) submit a cover price bid 
 (4) produce a rough Estimate and add mark up 
 (5) produce a detailed Estimate and add mark up 
 (6) add 'non-price features' to (5). 
 
 Options (3) and (4) are usually regarded as 'non serious' 
bids,  and options (5) and (6) as 'serious' or bona fide bids as 
detailed Estimates are invariably lower than rough Estimates.  
'Serious' bids are expected to be lower, certainly long term, 
than 'non serious' bids.  The prequalification system should, 
therefore, to comply with criterion (1) above, try to identify 
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contractors who are likely to enter serious bids. 
 
 
Optimal level of competition 
 
 It is usually assumed that the mere existence of a free 
market will automatically ensure competitive bidding.  As a 
result, large numbers of contractors are often encouraged to 
enter bids to guarantee a fully competitive auction.  A sample 
of Hong Kong open tender public sector contracts, for example, 
contained an average of approximately 17 bidders competing for 
each contract, with some contracts attracting over 30 bids [3]. 
 In the Hong Kong private sector, where selective tendering is 
generally used, a similar size sample contained an average of 10 
bidders for each contract [4]. 
 
 As the number of bidders varies from auction to auction, 
bidders typically adjust their bids to reflect the level of 
competition [1] and several empirical studies [11, 16, 27] have 
found an inverse relationship between the number of bidders and 
the value of the lowest and/or mean bid. 
 
 An objective of prequalifying bidders is to obtain an 
optimal level of competition, that is obtaining the lowest bid 
at a minimum cost of bidding.  This requires engaging the 
minimum number of bidders to obtain a genuine competitive bid.  
At sub-optimal levels of competition, contractors or clients may 
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suffer as a result of under-competition or over-competition. 
 
 To overcome fears of receiving higher bids as a result of 
reducing the number of competitors in competition, consultants 
have been urged to compile tender lists more carefully by 
choosing the most competitive bidders [22].  It has been 
suggested [6] that this can be done by considering contractors' 
experience, performance and current workload. 
 
 
Measuring competitiveness 
 
 The prequalification process should therefore try to ensure 
that a group of bidders is selected who will submit genuinely 
competitive bids.  This can be done, to some extent, by 
considering factors such as the bidders' experience, resources 
and current workload.  One approach is by systematically 
recording, in terms of competitiveness, previous bidding 
performances of bidders.  Then, by selecting the most 
competitive bidders, it may be possible to have fewer bidders 
without necessarily increasing the likely value of the lowest 
bid.  It is conceivable that a carefully monitored 
prequalification system may even generate lower bids than would 
have been received without prequalification. 
 
 Bidding performance concerns the relationship between bids 
submitted by different bidders in competition.  Although this 
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relationship can be quantified in purely relative terms [24], 
the model and subsequent analysis is quite difficult and not 
easily treated by conventional means.  For most practical 
purposes however it is sufficient to consider bids in relation 
to a baseline.  Common baselines include the designer's 
estimate, a bidder's cost estimate, or the mean, median or 
lowest of the bids entered for a contract.  In this case we use 
the latter measure as it is easily understood and because there 
are good theoretical reasons for assuming that the expected 
value of the winning bid is equal to the true value of the 
contract [eg 15, 28]. 
 
 A measure of competitiveness in bidding commonly found in 
the literature is the percentage of each bid above the baseline, 
or C-Competitiveness, ie 
 
 Ci = 100(xi - x(1))/x(1) (1) 
 
where x represents the bid value entered by an individual 
bidder, i, and x(1) represents the value of the lowest bid 
entered for the contract.  Clearly, lower percentage values 
indicate greater competitiveness, the lowest bidder having a 
competitiveness value of zero per cent. 
 
 By aggregating the C values for an individual bidder over a 
series of auctions it is then possible to examine that bidder's 
performance in terms of the frequency distribution of the 
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aggregated C values.  It is usual to consider two summary 
statistics describing the frequency distribution - the 
arithmetic mean, C', and standard deviation, C".  Low values of 
C' are taken to denote high competitiveness and low values of C" 
are taken to denote a high level of consistency of 
competitiveness. 
 
 
Competitiveness factors in bidding strategy 
 
 It has been said that long term differences between 
bidders' pricing are a reflection of their relative efficiencies 
- more efficient bidders tending to enter lower bids [7].  
Indeed, this is the basic precept of the market mechanism.  
However, in a less than stable environment such as the 
construction contract market, short term commercial 
considerations often predominate.  The mark up is such a 
consideration and, as a component of a bid, it follows that the 
factors influencing mark up levels also influence bid levels and 
thus competitiveness.  
 
 Many authors [eg 2, 10, 14, 26] have suggested many 
different factors that are considered in setting mark up values. 
 Different bidders have different degrees of preference towards 
the individual characteristics, such as size, type and location, 
of proposed contracts.  These are dictated to some extent by 
bidders' strategies and resources available. Further 
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considerations are present and future workloads, the workload of 
the industry as a whole and differences in perceptions of 
bidders concerning these matters. 
 
 Factors influencing competitiveness may be grouped into 
those affecting (1) group behaviour, (2) individual behaviour, 
and (3) contract characteristics (see Fig. 1).  The degree to 
which these factors influence competitiveness levels is 
dependent on the baseline estimates and levels of mark-up 
emanating from the bidders' strategies or policies. 
 
 Bidding strategy is concerned with setting the mark up 
level to a value that is likely to provide the best pay-off.  In 
determining mark up levels, different bidders have differing 
degrees of selectivity between contracts.  Those who are more 
selective concentrate on particular contract characteristics 
such as type and size.  Those who are less selective place less 
emphasis on the contract characteristics than on other factors 
such as workload or resources available.  Bidders who carefully 
select contracts for which they enter serious bids may be 
regarded as 'market' or 'preference driven'.  Those bidders who 
place most emphasis on workload may be regarded as 'resource' or 
'constraint driven'.  These categories are neither exhaustive 
nor mutually exclusive and some bidders may place equally high 
or low emphasis on market and resource factors. 
 
 Separating selective from constraint based strategies is a 
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reflection of the two complementary approaches economists have 
developed in studying business behaviour.  One is to try to 
explain business behaviour through the goals of the firm, the 
argument being that decision makers select the actions and 
strategies that they perceive best contribute to reaching the 
firm's goals.  The other holds that market conditions and 
competition drives or constrains a firms behaviour [25, pp. 
251].  It also effectively reflects Gabor's [9] work on pricing 
behaviour that separates 'market oriented' from 'resource-based' 
pricing approaches. 
 
 The idea of preference and constraint driven bidders can 
also be related to Porter's work [19] in which he identifies 
three strategies; 
 
(1) cost leadership: firm aims for the lowest cost and 
achieves superior profitability from an 
above average price margin. 
 
(2) differentiation: firm strives to differentiate its 
products such that it can raise price more 
than the cost of differentiating and 
thereby achieve superior profitability. 
 
(3) focus :  firm concentrates on a particular segment 
of the market and applies either a cost 
leadership or differentiation strategy. 
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 Bidders who adopt a cost leadership strategy are likely to 
be constrained by their ability to cut costs in an attempt to 
achieve superior profitability rather than be selective towards 
certain contract characteristics.  However, bidders who choose a 
focus strategy are likely to place a greater emphasis on 
preference rather than constraint. 
 
 The idea of preference and constraint driven is not 
directly applicable to bidders who use a differentiation 
strategy.  These bidders are hoping to win contracts through, 
for example, reputation even though their bids may not be the 
lowest.  It is worth noting that such a strategy is likely to be 
more successful in the private sector.  This is because of 
public accountability in the public sector normally means that 
contracts have to be awarded to the lowest bidder only. 
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Classification of bidders 
 
 The degree of influence with which various competitiveness 
factors affect bidding performance can be measured in terms of 
C-Competitiveness.  The smaller the values of C the greater, in 
terms of competitiveness, is the influence of a particular 
combination of competitiveness factors.  This combination varies 
from bidder to bidder and from contract to contract.  Some 
factors are likely to emerge as more dominant than others.  For 
example, a preference driven bidder is likely to be consistently 
more competitive in bidding for contracts with certain 
characteristics, such as contract size and type. 
 
 If the average C-Competitiveness, C', observed for certain 
competitiveness factors is a reflection of the preference the 
bidder places on each of those factors, then significant 
differences between C' values for each factor necessarily 
indicate significant differences in preferences between the 
factors themselves. 
 
 Prequalifying bidders by their C-Competitiveness can be 
used to distinguish those bidders who are likely to submit 
serious bids from those who are likely to submit non-serious 
bids.  The more competitive bidders, ie bidders who attain lower 
C' values, are likely to have submitted the greatest proportion 
of serious bids in previous competitions.  Considering C' 
together with C", we can represent various classes of bidding 
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behaviour (Fig. 2).  Bidders with low C' values and low C" 
values represent Sensible bidders, as they are consistently 
competitive.  In contrast, bidders with low C' values but high 
C" values represent Suicidal as, besides being serious, they are 
also erratic - a potentially fatal behaviour in competitive 
bidding.  Conversely, bidders with high C' values and low C" 
values are Non-Serious as they are consistently uncompetitive.  
Consequently, bidders with high C' values and high C" values 
(termed Silly here) are generally uncompetitive but erratic, not 
an uncommon characteristic in construction contract bidders.  
Although a rather crude and insensitive classification system, 
this does have considerable intuitive appeal in reflecting the 
underlying pivotal characteristics of the actual behaviour of 
participants in competitive bidding environments 
 
 This 4-way classification - Sensible, Suicidal, Non-Serious 
and Silly - is important from the clients' viewpoint.  Sensible 
and Non-Serious are essentially low risk bidders, whilst 
Suicidal and Silly are essentially high risk bidders.  Non-
Serious and Silly, on the other hand are essentially high cost 
bidders, whilst Sensible and Suicidal are low cost bidders.  
Which class of bidder is to be prequalified ultimately depends 
on the client's attitude to risk and cost trade-off.  It is also 
important for bidders to be able to identify their competitors 
and themselves in terms of these classes.  It has been found 
that success in winning contracts is associated with consistent 
competitively bidding for particular contract types or 
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comparatively high bidding variability [3]. 
 
 The information needed to identify the appropriate class of 
bidder can be obtained by analysis of historical data contained 
in tender reports.  A bidder's likely classification can be 
adduced according to discrete variables such as contract type, 
location or client or according to continuous variables such as 
contract size.  These variables can be analysed individually or, 
providing there is sufficient data, according to any desired 
combination. 
 
 Previous empirical studies have shown that C-
Competitiveness of individual bidders is correlated in varying 
degrees with contract type [3, 4] and these differences are 
accentuated in the public sector [3, 4, 6].  As a result, a case 
study was undertaken of various types of public sector contracts 
to investigate the C-Competitiveness approach to the 
classification of bidding behaviour. 
 
 
 4. CASE STUDY 
 
 A total of 2531 bids from 193 bidders for 199 contracts let 
between 1980 and 1990 were collected from the Architectural 
Services Department of the Hong Kong Government.  This 
represented general construction contracts for six contract 
types according to CI/SfB classification (see Table 1).  Each 
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bidder was assigned a code to preserve identity.  On average 13 
bids were received for each contract. 
 
 
All bidders 
 
 Using data for all the bidders in the sample, the overall 
mean C-Competitiveness, C', was correlated with the standard 
deviation, C".  This produced a positive correlation coefficient 
of 0.614 (n=149, p=0.000) for bidders having more than one 
bidding attempt.  As pointed out in an earlier paper [4], the 
correlation of C' with C" is expected as bidders with high C' 
but low C" (i.e., Non-Serious) would fail to get any work.  
Conversely, bidders with low C' but high C" (i.e., Suicidal) 
would eventually become bankrupt. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the scatterplot of all the coded bidders in the 
sample (bidders entering only one bid have been assigned a zero 
standard deviation).  The central cluster of bidders represents 
the typical bidders performance in terms of C' and C".  It is 
also interesting that no bidder has a low C' and high C".  This 
has been denoted Fig. 3 as the 'impossible region'.  Clearly 
this phenomenon is symptomatic of the measure used for, as C-
Competitiveness is constrained to be above zero, small C" values 
are hardly possible for greater values of C'.  It could also, 
however, be because there are few Suicidal bidders in the 
sample. 
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Most frequent bidders 
 
 The most frequent bidders, ie those who bid ten times or 
more in the sample, were selected for analysis as it was 
considered that the results obtained would be more 
representative of their bidding behaviour.  The C' and C" values 
of this subset of 78 bidders were found to have an even stronger 
correlation of 0.755 (n=78, p=0.000). 
 
 Fig. 4 shows the overall bidding performance broken down 
into the four competitiveness classification quadrants, the axes 
of the quadrants being determined according to the mean C' and 
C" of this grouping of bidders.  Due to the strong positive 
correlation, most bidders fall in the Sensible-Silly quadrants, 
44 being classified as Sensible and 18 as Silly.  Of the 16 
remaining, 13 were Non-Serious while 3 were Suicidal.  There 
appears to be some evidence of a lengthy Sensible-Silly 
continuum, with several bidders reaching towards the 
extremities.  The Non-Serious-Suicidal continuum, on the other 
hand is much shorter - indicating fewer extreme differences 
between the bidders on this scale. 
 
The objective of submitting a bona fide competitive bid is to 
become the lowest bidder and thereby win the contract.  The next 
part of the analysis therefore examines the question 'which of 
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the four groups is most successful at becoming the lowest bidder 
and thereby securing the contract?'  In terms of success at 
becoming the lowest bidder, the logical sequence should rank in 
descending order of Suicidal, Sensible, Silly and Non-Serious.  
To answer this question, therefore, the number of lowest bids 
was expressed as a proportion to the total number of bidding 
attempts to produce the success ratio for each quadrant.  This 
yielded the following success ratios; Suicidal = 0.163, Sensible 
= 0.100, Silly = 0.048, Non-Serious = 0.034 against an overall 
average of 0.082.  The result therefore concurs with the above 
stated hypothesis. 
 
 Bidders were then considered in terms of contract type 
groupings, within each classification,  and tabulated according 
to their overall performance classification.  Table 2 shows the 
classification for each bidder across contract types, single 
bidding attempts being shown separately.  Consider first the 
Sensible group of bidders.  Some bidders are clearly 
consistently Sensible over all contract types (eg bidders 1, 6, 
7, 72, 96, 136, 150 and 178).  It could be argued that this 
group of bidders is of unfocused cost leaders as they appear to 
be competitive over all contract types, and that clients can be 
assured of receiving a competitive bid irrespective of contract 
type.  Those border line cases who just fall into the Sensible 
competitive quadrant (eg bidders 20, 40, 84, 119, 135 and 141) 
show a mixed classification over the various contract types.  In 
this case it could be argued that these bidders are focused.  In 
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general then it seems that this Sensible group of bidders can be 
regarded as lying on an unfocused-focused continuum.  This 
corresponds to a C'-C" diagonal line running from bottom left to 
top right through the Sensible quadrant in Fig. 4.  Based on 
this model, we would therefore consider bidders 11, 75, and 178 
for instance also to be unfocused cost leaders despite the lack 
of available direct evidence. 
 
 Of the few bidders classified as Suicidal, none are 
actually classed as Suicidal for individual contract types.  
With one exception, they are classed as either Sensible or 
Silly.  This suggests that they are focused but, as implied by 
the class, are rather more risky in their bidding than the 
bidders in the Sensible group.  In the Non-Serious group, some 
of the bidders (eg 95, 121 and 142) may be considered focused, 
whilst others in the group are clearly Non-Serious over all 
contract types.  Similar but weaker traits to the Sensible 
bidders are reflected in the results for the Silly group of 
bidders.  Bidder 43 is unique in that he is classified as Silly 
over all contract types while bidders 45, 92 and 114 have shown 
themselves to be either Silly or Non-Serious over all contract 
types. 
 
 Table 3 gives a breakdown of the total number of bidding 
attempts and successes for the various contract types.  As 
indicated in the Table, the number of successes is not evenly 
distributed over the different contract types (eg bidder 96 has 
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a success ratio of 0.47 for contract type 848 compared a success 
ratio of 0.08 for the remaining contract types).  Again, this 
appears to support the existence of focusing strategies. 
 
 Table 2 and 3 together show that all bidders who had 5 or 
more successes at a particular type were classified as Sensible 
for that particular type.  Although those bidders who had 
between 1 and 4 successes at one particular type came from the 
different classification groupings, the dominant grouping in 
terms of success is the Sensible group of bidders.  The most 
successful bidders from the Sensible group were bidders 7, 96, 
119, 148, and 150 who had a bid/success ratio of 0.37, 0.21, 
0.17, 0.16, and 0.18 respectively.  The principal reason for the 
comparatively high success ratios may be that in all instances 
these bidders were more competitive on particular contract 
types.  For example, bidders 7, 96, 119 and 150 had success 
ratios of 0.45, 0.47, 0.22 and 0.33 respectively for contract 
type 848.  Bidder 148 had a success ratio of 0.26 for contract 
type 374.  Of the Suicidal bidders, bidder 52 with a success 
ratio of 0.16 in total, was classified as Sensible for contract 
type 712 with a success ratio of 0.40. 
 
 Apart from bidder 61, who had three successes (ie a success 
ratio of 0.21) on contract type 713, those classified as Silly 
on individual types were restricted to 1 or 2 successes on each 
type.  All the Non-Serious bidders were restricted to either 1 
or 2 successes on each contract type.  The least successful Non-
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Serious bidder was bidder 142 who didn't win a single contract 
in 67 bidding attempts.  Bidders who were successful more than 
once were found in five of the six contract types.  The 
exception was contract type 373.  This is probably due to the 
comparatively small sample size for this type. 
 
 
 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 A major issue in prequalification is in ensuring that 
genuine competitive bids are likely to be received from bidders. 
 Bidders may be classified from a client's perspective in terms 
of cost and risk.  Low cost/low risk bidders are termed 
Sensible, high cost/low risk bidders are termed Non-Serious, low 
cost/high risk bidders are termed Suicidal and high cost/high 
risk bidders are termed Silly.  The type of bidder to be 
selected depends on the balance between cost and risk, which is 
ultimately the concern of the client and should be reflected in 
the prequalification system.  In general, the most desirable 
bidders are likely to be: 
 
o 'Sensible', irrespective of the contract characteristics 
such as contract type (i.e., identifying those who are 
unfocused cost leaders) 
 
o 'Sensible', in terms of certain contract characteristics 
such as contract type (i.e., identifying those who are 
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focused cost leaders) 
 
 The latter group consists of specialists whose 
competitiveness is likely to have been developed over a period. 
 Specialists are distinguished by their unequal distribution of 
successes across different contract types.  Specialists who had 
been successful more than once for a particular contract type 
were found to exist for all but one of the six contract types 
under study. 
 
 In this paper we describe a method of identifying and 
classifying potential bidders' contract preferences in terms of 
C-Competitiveness. 
 
 In a case study of construction contract bidding, a 
significant positive correlation between competitiveness and 
consistency resulted in most bidders being classified as 
Sensible or Silly.  More extreme cases of Sensible and Silly 
bidders were found than in the Suicidal and Non-Serious 
categories, where bidders were much less differentiated.  Some 
evidence was found for separating focused and unfocused bidders 
depending on their position in Sensible quadrant.  An analysis 
of 'most frequent bidders', ie bidders recorded as entering bids 
for ten or more contracts, showed this trend to be even 
stronger. 
 
 The average success ratios for the four groups of bidders 
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indicated the Suicidal bidders had the most success in winning 
contracts.  This was followed, as expected, by the Sensible, 
Silly, and Non-Serious groups.  Analysis of the Sensible group, 
identified bidders who were consistently Sensible (ie unfocused 
cost leaders) over all contract types, and 
bidders who were Sensible (ie focused cost leaders) over only 
some contract types.  The position of these bidders in the 
Sensible quadrant suggested the existence of an unfocused-
focused continuum and this was used to identify further 
unfocused bidders.  Bidders classed as Suicidal were also 
thought to be focused but, as implied by the class name, rather 
more risky in their bidding.  Some evidence of focusing was also 
found in the Non-Serious and Silly groups, but on a much reduced 
scale. 
 
 Bidders who met with five or more successes for a 
particular contract type were invariably classified as Sensible 
for that type.  Bidders classified as Silly or Non-Serious were, 
with one exception, restricted to one or two successes per 
contract type.  An interesting inference from this observation 
might be that those Sensible bidders winning more than one 
contract for a particular type did so more by judgement than 
luck.  Silly bidders winning more than one contract for a 
particular type, on the other hand, could be said to do so more 
by luck than judgement. 
 
 Clearly, it is important to add more qualitative data to 
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the analysis to confirm the postulated relationships between 
bidders' strategies and the classifications developed here.  
This could best be achieved by meetings with successful and 
unsuccessful bidders and this is planned for the next stage of 
the research. 
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